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Abstract
We develop a reciprocity-based model of wage determination and incorporate it into a modern
dynamic general equilibrium framework. We estimate the model and ﬁnd that, among potential
determinants of wages, rent-sharing (between workers and ﬁrms) and wage entitlement (based on
wages earned in the past) are important to ﬁt the dynamic responses of output, wages and inﬂation
to various exogenous shocks. Aggregate employment conditions (measuring workers’ outside op-
tion), on the other hand, are found to play only a negligible role for wage setting. These results are
broadly consistent with micro-studies on reciprocity in labor relations but contrast with traditional
eﬃciency wage models which emphasize aggregate labor market variables as the main determinant
of wage setting.
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1. Introduction
Dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models postulating nominal price and
wage contracts replicate surprisingly well key business cycle properties. They are, for that
reason, increasingly used for monetary policy analysis. Recent studies documenting the
performance of these models include Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2005, CEE hence-
forth), Altig, Christiano, Eichenbaum and Lindé (2004, ACEL henceforth) and Smets and
Wouters (2007). These studies uniformly ﬁnd that nominal wage contracts are crucial for
model performance and conclude that a deeper understanding of the contours and implica-
tions of wage rigidity needs to be developed.
Standard nominal wage contract models deliver wage rigidity through a reduced-form
process imposing that a fraction of workers is prevented from re-optimizing their wage de-
mands in response to new information. By contrast, the present paper proposes a model
of wage determination based on reciprocity in labor relations. In line with eﬃciency wage
theory, eﬀort per hour worked in our model is unobservable and thus cannot be contracted
upon. The central hypothesis is that workers may derive a psychological beneﬁt from recip-
rocating a generous wage oﬀer by the ﬁrm with harder work, even though providing eﬀort
per se is costly and there are no explicit incentives for doing so. Firms are aware of the
workers’ reciprocity motive and set wages so as to elicit a proﬁt maximizing level of eﬀort.
In equilibrium, this leads to a form of conditional wage rigidity that is distinct from the
unconditional rigidity in standard wage contract models.
Section 2 reviews the related literature. Section 3 describes the model. Inspired by
Rabin’s (1993) introduction of fairness into game theory and building on our previous adap-
tation of this concept for macroeconomics (Danthine and Kurmann, 2007), we explicitly
model the psychological beneﬁt derived from reciprocity as the product of the worker’s gift
to the ﬁrm in terms of eﬀort and the ﬁrm’s gift to the worker in terms of remuneration. The
latter is measured as the diﬀerence between the utility resulting from the actual wage oﬀer2 3
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and the utility obtained under a reference compensation level. Building on micro evidence
about reciprocity in labor relations, we let this reference compensation level depend on three
potential factors: the worker’s outside option described by external labor market conditions;
ﬁrm-internal labor productivity representing rent-sharing considerations; and past wages
capturing the notion of wage entitlement on the part of workers.
Section 4 analyzes the theoretical implications of the model. Section 5 evaluates the busi-
ness cycle implications of the model in a modern DSGE framework featuring sticky prices,
habit persistence in consumption, variable capital utilization and investment adjustment
cost. We estimate the diﬀerent structural parameters by minimizing the distance between
the model-based impulse responses and their empirical counterparts computed from a vector
autoregression (VAR) with respect to a neutral technology shock, an investment-speciﬁc tech-
nology shock and a monetary policy shock. The estimation attributes substantial importance
to wage entitlement while also giving signiﬁcant weight to rent-sharing in the determination
of the reference wage. By contrast, external labor market conditions are estimated to matter
only marginally. These results are largely consistent with micro evidence on reciprocity in
labor relations. Overall, the estimated model ﬁts the empirical VAR dynamics surprisingly
well. In particular, the presence of rent-sharing allows the model to simultaneously replicate
the sluggish response of inﬂation after a monetary policy shock and the sharp drop in inﬂa-
tion on impact of a neutral technology shock. This is an interesting diﬀerence to models with
nominal wage contracts, which typically fail to generate these distinct conditional responses
of inﬂation that are a robust feature of U.S. data.1
Section 6 concludes.
1For economy of space, we defer an in-depth comparison with the nominal wage contracts model to a
web-appendix, available at http://www.er.uqam.ca/nobel/r16374. The appendix also provides a detailed
derivation of the reciprocity model and assesses the robustness of the results along various dimensions.4 5
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2. Related Literature
The reciprocity hypothesis receives strong support from a large number of survey studies
bearing on labor relations (e.g., Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler, 1986; or Bewley, 1999) as
well as from laboratory experiments in behavioral economics (e.g., Fehr and Falk, 1999).2
Both strands of literature also document that ﬁrms often refrain from oﬀering explicit rewards
for eﬀort because such mechanisms are costly and may negatively aﬀect work morale.
Reciprocity in labor relations was introduced into macroeconomics by Akerlof (1982).
As in more conventional eﬃciency wage formulations such as Salop’s (1979) labor turnover
theory or Shapiro and Stiglitz’ (1984) shirking model, the reference compensation level in
Akerlof ’s (1982) model depends entirely on the worker’s expected earnings outside of the
ﬁrm. Rent-sharing and wage entitlement features are not present.
This focus on ﬁrm-external wage references contrasts strongly with the available micro
evidence. Bewley (2002), for example, concludes that "...employees usually have little notion
of a fair or market value for their services and quickly come to believe that they are entitled
to their existing wage, no matter how high it may be..." (page 7).3 At the same time, workers
also seem to care about ﬁrm-internal reference points, a concept that Kahneman, Knetsch
and Thaler (1986) associate with the notion of dual entitlement; i.e. ﬁrms are entitled to a
reference proﬁt while workers are entitled to a reference salary. This receives strong support
from numerous survey and experimental studies (e.g. Fehr, Gächter and Kirchsteiger, 1997).
Danthine and Donaldson (1990) are the ﬁrst to incorporate reciprocity in labor relations
into a modern DSGE context. They ﬁnd that when the worker’s reference compensation
level depends only on ﬁrm-external labor market conditions as in Akerlof (1982), the model
fails to improve the ability of DSGE models to replicate business cycle facts. Collard and
De la Croix (2000) and Danthine and Kurmann (2004) subsequently show that including the
2See Fehr and Gächter (1999) and Bewley (2002) for an extensive discussion of the empirical evidence.
3The importance of workers’ past wages as a reference point is stressed in studies by Levine (1993),
Campbell and Kamlani (1997) or Bewley (1999).4 5
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workers’ past wage in their wage reference generates substantial real rigidity and improves the
empirical performance of DSGE models. Danthine and Kurmann (2007), in turn, introduce
rent-sharing but stop short of analyzing the implications in a full-blown DSGE framework.
In the present paper, we allow for both wage entitlement and rent-sharing in an explicit
model of reciprocity and evaluate the implications in a medium-scale DSGE framework. To
our knowledge, Rotemberg (2008) is the only other study that explicitly introduces non-
pecuniary considerations in labor relations into a DSGE framework. His model is quite
diﬀerent, however, providing an alternative perspective to the present attempt.4
Our paper also relates to recent studies by Hall (2005) and Shimer (2005) among many
others who assess the empirical performance of DSGE models with search frictions in the
labor market. They conclude that the standard search model where wages are determined by
Nash bargaining fails to generate quantitatively important responses to exogenous technology
shocks. By contrast, the labor search model becomes more successful if wages are constrained
to be a function of past wages. The wage entitlement dimension of our reciprocity-based
model oﬀers a rationale for this dependence on past wages.
3. The Model
The economy is populated by ﬁve types of agents: households, intermediate goods pro-
ducers, ﬁnal goods retailers, a ﬁnancial intermediary and a monetary authority. Aside from
the reciprocity-based mechanism for wage setting, the economy is very similar to the ho-
mogenous capital model in ACEL (2004). In line with eﬃciency wage theory, we assume
that eﬀort per unit of labor is an input to production but that it cannot be directly observed.
In contrast to labor hours, eﬀort is therefore not contractible. Producers understand, how-
4An interesting alternative is Alexopoulos (2004) who considers a shirking model where instead of dis-
missal, detected shirkers face monetary punishment. The resulting model implies that equilibrium wages
depend positively on consumption and negatively on employment. This negative dependence on employment
has similar eﬀects on wage setting than rent-sharing in our model and is shown to generate some wage rigid-
ity. However, the results in Alexopoulos (2004) depend crucially on the degree of consumption insurance
that workers receive.6 7
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ever, that while workers dislike eﬀort per se, they derive utility from reciprocating a generous
wage oﬀer with a commensurate eﬀort level even in the absence of monitoring.
3.1. Households
There is a [0 1] continuum of identical individuals spread across a [0 1] continuum of
identical households. In each household, some of the individuals are working while others
are unemployed. An individual’s momentary utility is given by









where Ct stands for current consumption, Ct−1 is the previous period’s consumption, b ≥ 0
is the habit parameter, 1 is total hours available per individual, Lt is the fraction of hours
worked, and et is the eﬀort level per hour worked. The term �(et,·) admits that workers
derive utility from reciprocal behavior towards their employer.5 The optimality condition
guiding this decision is
et = �e(et,·). (1)
We call this equation the Eﬀort Condition (EC). As long as �e(et,·) > 0, workers are willing
to reward a wage oﬀer perceived as generous with positive eﬀort even though no direct
material gain derives from such action.6
Following Rogerson (1988) and Hansen (1985), labor is assumed to be indivisible in the
sense that individuals would like to supply L∗
t but that they have to choose between working
a ﬁxed shift H > L∗
t or not working at all. In such a situation, the household can make
its members better oﬀ by providing a lottery whereby a fraction Nt of individuals work
5The function �(et,·) potentially depends on many more variables than eﬀort, among them the ﬁrm’s
wage. The atomistic representative worker is assumed to take these additional variables as exogenous.
6Rabin (1993) also entertains the possibility, but we do not follow his lead on this score, that a perverse
equilibrium may arise whereby the worker’s punishment of an unfair wage oﬀer in terms of lower than normal
eﬀort provides the worker with extra utility.6 7
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a fraction H hours while the remaining 1 − Nt individuals remain unemployed. In view
of avoiding heterogeneity, we assume that households make all investment decisions and
redistribute income net of investment to their members. For the type of separable preferences
assumed here, eﬃcient risk sharing implies an identical level of consumption for employed








log(Ct − bCt−1) + Nt
￿








where E0 is the expectations operation given information at time 0.
The optimal decision problem is split into two subperiods. Households come into the
ﬁrst subperiod with physical capital stock Kt, real money holdings Mt/Pt and a perfectly
diversiﬁed portfolio of claims to ﬁrms. After the realization of the technology shocks (de-
scribed below), households decide on their participation to the lottery Nt and collect labor
income WtNt, capital income RK
t Kt and dividends from ﬁrms Dt. Households then allocate
resources between investment in new capital It and consumption Ct. In the second sub-
period, the money growth shock μt = ¯ Mt/ ¯ Mt−1 realizes and households receive a transfer
(μMt − 1) ¯ Mt/Pt from the monetary authority. Households then decide on their real cash
holdings Qt and deposit the remainder Mt/Pt − Qt + (μt − 1)Ma
t /Pt with a ﬁnancial inter-















Cash demand in this economy is positive because cash facilitates consumption transactions.
Speciﬁcally, let velocity of the household’s cash balances be deﬁned as υt ≡ Ct/Qt. The
larger velocity, the lower the transaction costs η(υt) on consumption; i.e. η� < 0 and η�� > 0.8 9
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The capital stock evolves according to
Kt+1 = [1 − δ(ut)]Kt + VtF(It,It−1), (3)
where F(It,It−1) = (1−S(It/It−1))It embodies investment adjustment cost with S satisfying
S(ΔI) = S�(ΔI) = 0 in steady state and S�� ≥ 0; and Vt denotes an exogenous investment-
speciﬁc technology shock. As in Fisher (2006), the growth rate μV,t ≡ Vt/Vt−1 of this shock
is governed by ˆ μV,t = ρμV ˆ μV,t−1 + εμV ,t, where ˆ μV,t = (μV,t − μV)/μV is deﬁned as the
percentage deviation from steady state μV and εμV ,t is an i.i.d. innovation with mean zero
and variance σ2
εμV . Following King and Rebelo (2000), the depreciation rate δ(ut) is an
increasing convex function of capital utilization ut by ﬁrms. By no arbitrage, it must be true
that VtRK
t = μV,tRtPt−1/Pt − 1 + δ(ut).
3.2. Reciprocity
We follow the approach of Rabin (1993) as adapted to a modern macroeconomic setting
by Danthine and Kurmann (2007) and deﬁne �(et,·) as the product of the respective ’gifts’
of an employed individual (i.e. the representative worker) and the ﬁrm
�(et,·) = d(et,·)g(Wt,·).
The factors d(et,·) and g(Wt,·) are both concave and denote, respectively, the gift of the
representative worker in terms of eﬀort towards the ﬁrm and the gift of the ﬁrm in terms
of the wage towards the worker. Hence, when workers perceive a wage oﬀer as generous
(i.e., g(Wt,·) > 0), their utility increases if they reciprocate the gift with higher eﬀort (i.e.,
d(et,·) > 0). The representative agent assumption of the indivisible labor framework implies
that for this calculation, workers do not take into account the impact of their own eﬀort
on the ﬁrm’s output and thus on the gift of the ﬁrm; i.e., ge(Wt,·) = 0 in the eyes of the
representative worker.8 9
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In deﬁning d(et,·) and g(Wt,·), we follow Rabin one more step and measure the gifts as
the deviation of eﬀort and wages, respectively, from some reference or norm levels. Given
our speciﬁcation of preferences, the norm eﬀort level for the worker is quite naturally en = 0.




with 0 < α < 1. This speciﬁcation considerably simpliﬁes the ensuing analysis. At the same
time, we note that the dynamics of the log-linearized model would not be aﬀected if we
multiplied the right-hand side by a constant or allowed for a more general functional form.7
The deﬁnition of the wage reference in the speciﬁcation of the ﬁrm’s gift is more critical
because, as we will see, this aﬀects the optimal wage policy of the ﬁrm. As discussed in
Section 2, various hypotheses have been entertained on this point. Our strategy is to adopt
an encompassing speciﬁcation with the goal of letting the data speak. We deﬁne
g(Wt,·) = log[(1 − τt)Wt] − ϕ1 log[(1 − τt)ψtYt/nt] (5)
−ϕ2 log[(1 − τt) ¯ Wt¯ nt] − ϕ3 log[(1 − τt)[s ¯ Wt−1 + (1 − s)Wt−1]],
The ﬁrst term, log[(1 − τt)Wt], is the consumption utility that the worker attributes to the
ﬁrm’s actual wage oﬀer. The variable τt in this expression denotes the state-contingent tax
rate that the household applies to the revenue of workers so as to implement optimal risk
sharing across household members. The remaining terms in g(Wt,·) deﬁne a weighted sum
of utility levels that would obtain for various reference compensation points. In particular,
the term log[(1 − τt)ψtYt/Nt] describes the utility obtained if the ﬁrm distributed its entire
revenue to its workers and thus proxies for the ﬁrm’s ability to pay. The term log[(1−τt) ¯ Wt¯ nt]
measures the worker’s expected utility from leaving the ﬁrm and work elsewhere. Finally,
the term log[(1 − τt)[s ¯ Wt−1 + (1 − s)Wt−1]] captures the utility level obtained if the salary
7The appendix provides more details on robustness along this dimension. In earlier versions of the paper,
we experimented with a speciﬁcation that featured non-zero norm eﬀort but found that this had little eﬀect
on the dynamics of the model.10 11
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were to stay at last period’s level. For s = 1 we are in the so-called ’social-norm’ case where
the worker considers the past aggregate wage level as the reference. For s = 0 we are in the
’personal-norm’ case where the worker consider her own past wage within the ﬁrm as the
relevant reference. We do not impose either of these two extreme cases and instead estimate
s from the data.
3.3. Firms
3.3.1. Intermediate goods producers
Intermediate goods producers sell their product in a perfectly competitive market to




where At denotes an exogenous neutral technology shock. The growth rate μA,t ≡ At/At−1
evolves according to ˆ μA,t = ρμAˆ μA,t−1 + εμA,t, where ˆ μA,t is the percentage deviation from
steady state μA and εμA,t is an i.i.d. innovation with mean zero and variance σ2
εμA.
Eﬀort et cannot be observed directly by the ﬁrm. However, ﬁrms understand that work-
ers provide eﬀort according to (1). Furthermore, the ﬁrm knows that households let their
members participate in the labor market only if the wage exceeds the total marginal disu-
tility from working. The intermediate goods ﬁrm therefore chooses real wages Wt, labor nt,












subject to the household’s participation constraint, the eﬀort condition (1) and technology
(6). The ﬁrm’s problem is dynamic because the wage set today may inﬂuence eﬀort tomor-
row through the existence of the ﬁrm’s past wage Wt−1 in the eﬀort condition (1). Since
households are the ultimate owners, ﬁrms discount future cash ﬂows by β
jΛt+j, where Λt+j10 11
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denotes the marginal utility of consumption in t + j. The wage bill in t + j is multiplied by
Rt+j because we assume, as in CEE (2005) and ACEL (2004), that ﬁrms need to borrow the
wage bill from a ﬁnancial intermediary (see below).
3.3.2. Retailers




t is proportional to trend output and ensures that there is a stationary proﬁt-
to-output ratio. Production occurs through linear transformation of intermediate goods Yt
into diﬀerentiated ﬁnal good Yt(z). As noted above, these intermediate goods are traded in
a competitive market at relative price ψt; i.e. ψt is the real marginal cost of ﬁnal goods.












t is the total demand; and θp > 1 denotes the elasticity of substitution. The demand









where Pt(z) is the price of ﬁnal good z, which is set according to a variant of the partial
adjustment process proposed by Calvo (1983). In every period, a fraction κp of intermediate
goods ﬁrms are deprived of the opportunity to reoptimize their price. They instead update





where πt−1 ≡ Pt−1/Pt−2 denotes last period’s aggregate inﬂation, and π denotes trend in-
ﬂation. The probability κp is constant through time and independent of ﬁrms’ individual
pricing history. The case ωp = 1 corresponds to ACEL’s (2004) speciﬁcation for which there
is full indexation to past inﬂation.12 13
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3.3.3. Financial intermediary
As mentioned above, intermediate good producers cover their wage bill Wtnt by borrowing
from a ﬁnancial intermediary. The ﬁnancial intermediary funds these loans from household
deposits Mt/Pt − Qt + (μt − 1) ¯ Mt/Pt. At the end of the period, ﬁrms pay back Rt ¯ Wt¯ nt to
the intermediary which then returns Rt[Mt/Pt − Qt + (μt − 1) ¯ Mt/Pt] to households.
3.4. Monetary policy
We assume that the central bank follows a money growth rule of the form
ˆ μM,t = ˆ μM∗,t + φAˆ μA,t + φV
1 − α
α
ˆ μV t, (11)
with ˆ μM∗,t = ρμMˆ μM∗,t−1 + εμM,t, where εμM,t is an i.i.d. shock with mean zero and variance
σ2
εμM; and φA, φV allow for accommodation of the two technology shocks.
3.5. Aggregation and general equilibrium
Since all intermediate producers are identical, we have Wt = ¯ Wt and ¯ nt = nt. Further-
more, Mt = ¯ Mt in equilibrium. Loan market clearing thus implies
WtNt = μtMt − Qt. (12)
As shown in Yun (1996), constant returns to scale technology and competitive input markets
imply that all price setters operate on the same aggregate real marginal cost schedule, inde-
pendent of their price level. The same is true here for retailers. As a result, the aggregate
price dynamics is fully summarized by the price level of reoptimizing ﬁrms and the average
price charged by non-optimizing ﬁrms, which is simply last period’s aggregate price times the
indexing factor πω
t−1π1−ω. This allows us to derive the national income accounting equation8
Yt = [1 + η(υt)]Ct + It + φXt. (13)
8In this equation, we ignore the relative price deﬁned in Yun (1996) that links intermediate goods pro-
duction Yt to ﬁnal goods usage Y
f
t . For our loglinearized evaluation of the model, this is of no consequence.12 13
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In our analysis, we are also interested in economy-wide proﬁts by ﬁrms, deﬁned as
profitst = Yt − RtWtnt − φXt. (14)
The general equilibrium dynamics of our model results from the various optimality condi-
tions and constraints described in this section. The quantitative results discussed in Section
5 arise from log-linearizing the diﬀerent equations around the non-stochastic steady states
of the appropriately normalized variables and then solving for the rational expectations
equilibrium with the numerical algorithm developed by King and Watson (1998).
4. Model implications
4.1. Labor market
The labor market in our model is determined by the intermediate producers’ decisions for
employment and the wage rate that maximize the present value of proﬁts subject to the EC





























The ﬁrst condition is labor demand. The elasticity ∂et
∂nt
nt
et ≥ 0 takes into account an unusual
margin: higher employment through its negative eﬀect on labor productivity may increase
the ﬁrm’s gift and therefore workers’ eﬀort. At a given wage, this leads ﬁrms to overhire
relative to a more standard labor market case.
The second condition describes how wages are set to elicit optimal eﬀort. The left-hand
side is the cost of increasing the wage rate. The ﬁrst term on the right-hand side shows the
9Firms also need to satisfy the household’s participation constraint. We implicitly set the indivisible
labor constant H such that this constraint is always satisﬁed.14 15
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current beneﬁt from doing so whereas the second term measures the negative eﬀect of a wage
increase on future eﬀort. We can use labor demand to rewrite this second condition as











where ε(et,Wt) = ∂et
∂Wt
Wt
et is the elasticity of eﬀort with respect to wages and so forth for
the other elasticities. We label this equation the Modiﬁed Solow Condition (MSC). For
ε(et,nt) = 0 and ε(et+1,Wt) = 0, the MSC reduces to Solow’s (1979) original condition,
which says that at the optimal wage rate, the marginal cost of an eﬀective unit of work
equals its average cost. For ε(et,nt) > 0, Solow’s condition no longer applies because a
marginal wage increase has an additional positive eﬀect on labor productivity. This in turn
decreases the ﬁrm’s gift and thus eﬀort. Likewise, for ε(et+1,Wt) < 0, the ﬁrm has to take
into account that a higher wage today makes it more diﬃcult to elicit eﬀort next period.
To make these trade-oﬀs explicit, we introduce our speciﬁcation of the worker’s gift






+ ϕ1 log(ψtYt/nt) + ϕ2 log( ¯ Wt¯ nt) + ϕ3 log(s ¯ Wt−1 + (1 − s)Wt−1) (18)
−α(1 − ϕ1 − ϕ2 − ϕ3)log(1 − τt),
where we have isolated the state-contingent tax part for convenience. This equation indicates
the wage that the ﬁrm needs to pay in order to elicit eﬀort level et as optimally determined
by the MSC. The EC and MSC together thus replace the labor supply schedule of standard
competitive models of the labor market. For ϕ1 > 0, the optimal wage increases with the
ﬁrm’s revenue per worker, a notion that we associate with rent-sharing. For ϕ2 > 0, the
optimal wage increases with the aggregate wage and employment level, two measures that
capture external labor market conditions. For ϕ3 > 0, the optimal wage depends positively
on past real wages, a notion that we call wage entitlement.
The wage setting equation (18) implies important parameter restrictions for an environ-
ment with stochastic growth in which eﬀort and the labor share WtNt/Yt are stationary (see14 15
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appendix for proof).10
Proposition 1 Stationarity of eﬀort and the labor share along the balanced growth path
requires ϕ1 + ϕ2 + ϕ3 = 1.
We can also apply the gift deﬁnitions in (4) and (5) to the MSC in (17) to derive an























The expression makes clear that the ﬁrm’s eﬀort decision is generally a complicated forward-
looking problem. However, there are two exceptions.
Proposition 2 For s = 1 (the pure social norm case) or ϕ3 = 0 (no wage entitlement),
ﬁrms ﬁnd it optimal to elicit a constant eﬀort level.
Proof: For s = 1 or ϕ3 = 0, the MSC in (19) reduces to e∗ = α(1 − ϕ1)/(2 − α)]1/(2−α).
4.2. Business cycle implications of rent-sharing and wage entitlement
To get a sense of the business cycle implications of rent-sharing and wage entitlement,
we loglinearize the model and abstract from physical capital. Ignoring constants, aggregate
production (6) and wage setting (18) become
ˆ yt = α(ˆ at + ˆ et + ˆ nt)




2−αˆ et + ϕ1(ˆ yt − ˆ nt) + ϕ2ˆ nt + ϕ3 ˆ wt−1
Hatted lower-case variables denote percentage deviations from the respective steady states
of the appropriately normalized aggregates.11
10The proposition implies that state-dependent household taxes drop out of all the equations.
11To simplify the analysis, we treat the neutral productivity shock At as a stationary variable. None of
the results change if we treat the neutral productivity shock as a non-stationary variables (as is the case in
the empirical analysis).16 17
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We focus on the social norm case s = 1 for which optimal eﬀort is constant; i.e. ˆ et = 0. In
so doing we anticipate our estimates in Section 5, which imply that eﬀort varies little or not at
all over the business cycle. Combining the ﬁrst two equations and imposing ϕ1+ϕ2+ϕ3 = 1











Despite its partial equilibrium character (ˆ wt depends on both ˆ nt and ˆ wt−1, which are en-
dogenous), this equation reveals interesting properties about the eﬀects of rent-sharing and
wage entitlement. The more workers’ eﬀort depends on rent-sharing (i.e. the larger ϕ1),
the stronger is the direct impact of technology shocks on wages, and the smaller (or more
negative) is the wage response to ﬂuctuations in hours worked. Rent-sharing thus has an
ambiguous general equilibrium inﬂuence on the response of wages to a technology shock. If
the equilibrium response of hours worked is large, rent-sharing reduces the wage response. If,
instead, hours worked react little or even negatively, rent-sharing increases the wage response
to a technology shock. Figure 1a illustrates these eﬀects by contrasting a labor market with
rent sharing (solid wage setting curve) with a labor market without rent sharing (dotted
wage setting curve). Suppose that before the technology shock, both economies are in the
same equilibrium (point E). If, as depicted, the labor demand curve shifts out relatively
little in response to a technology change ˆ at > 0, then the real wage adjusts more in the
rent-sharing economy (point E’ vs. point E”). By contrast, rent-sharing unambiguously
lowers the reaction of wages to monetary policy shocks (because ˆ at = 0 in this case). In fact,
if ϕ1 is suﬃciently large such that 1 − (2 − α)ϕ1 − ϕ3 < 0, wages and employment move in
opposite directions. Figure 1b depicts such a situation.
Now consider wage entitlement. Equation (20) indicates that the more past wages inﬂu-
ence workers’ eﬀort and thus the ﬁrm’s wage decision (i.e. the larger ϕ3), the smaller are
the eﬀects of movements in technology and employment and the larger is the persistence of
wage movements. If ϕ3 is suﬃciently large such that 1 − (2 − α)ϕ1 − ϕ3 < 0, wages and16 17
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employment move inversely.
Through wages, rent-sharing and wage entitlement can have a profound impact on real
marginal cost, which in loglinearized terms equals
ˆ ψt = α( ˆ Rt + ˆ wt) − αˆ at.
The smaller the wage response (a fortiori if it is negative), the more negative is the reaction of
real marginal cost to a technology shock. In response to a monetary policy shock, marginal
cost may also fall for two reasons. First, a monetary policy shock is typically associated
with a fall in the interest rate; i.e. ˆ Rt < 0. Second, if rent-sharing and wage entitlement are
suﬃciently strong, wages fall on impact as well.
This real marginal cost dynamics has interesting implications for inﬂation and proﬁts.
For inﬂation, our pricing restrictions imply a loglinearized equation of the form





1+βωp and γ =
(1−κp)(1−βκp)
κp(1+βωp) . Following the literature, we refer to
this equation as the New Keynesian Phillips curve (NKPC). Let δ1 ≤ 1 (δ2 ≥ 1) denote the
stable (unstable) root of this equation, then the NKPC can be expressed as











As long as the backward-looking component of inﬂation is unimportant (i.e. ωp and thus δ1
is small), inﬂation is predominantly driven by changes in present and future expected real
marginal costs (the more so the larger γ). In such a case, inﬂation drops after a technology
shock if real marginal cost falls on impact and remains persistently low thereafter. Concur-
rently, inﬂation reacts in a smooth, hump-shaped pattern to a monetary policy shock if real18 19
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marginal cost exhibits a delayed increase. For proﬁts, in turn, we can express (14) as
￿ profitst =
1/ψ − ˜ α
1 − ˜ α
ˆ yt −
˜ α
1 − ˜ α
ˆ ψt
with ˜ α ≡ α/(1−(1−α)ϕ1). Rent-sharing and wage entitlement aﬀect proﬁts in two diﬀerent
ways. First, the smaller (or more negative) the reaction of marginal cost to a shock, the
stronger the proﬁt response. Second, the larger ϕ1 (i.e., the stronger the rent-sharing motive),
the larger ˜ α and thus the more sensitive are proﬁts to output and real marginal cost.
Finally, consider the case of variable eﬀort (i.e. s < 1). In this case, the MSC in (17)
implies the following loglinearized dynamics for optimal eﬀort





1 − (1 − α)ϕ1
￿i ￿





(2−α)(1−ϕ1−(1−s)ϕ3β > 0. The ﬁrm ﬁnds it optimal to elicit a lower eﬀort level
today if (i) future proﬁts are expected to be valued higher by shareholders (Etˆ λt+1−ˆ λt > 0);
(ii) the price of intermediate goods is expected to increase (Etˆ ψt+1 − ˆ ψt > 0); (iii) future
production is expected to increase (Etˆ yt+1 − ˆ yt > 0). As we will see in the last part of
the paper, all three of these factors are typically positive after expansionary shocks and
thus, eﬀort will react countercyclically. But since this reaction remains small relative to the




We proceed with a quantitative evaluation of the full DSGE model described in Section 3.
We estimate the structural parameters by minimizing the distance between a set of impulse18 19
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responses functions (IRFs) implied by the model and their empirical counterparts from an
identiﬁed VAR. We adopt this limited information approach rather than a full-information
likelihood-based estimator for two reasons. First, our focus is on the dynamics of prominent
macro variables in response to speciﬁc shocks that have clear empirical counterparts in the
VAR literature. Second, we want to compare our results with recent studies by CEE (2005)
and ACEL (2004) who employ the same estimation approach to analyze the performance of
very similar DSGE models with nominal wage rigidities.
The speciﬁcation of our VAR follows closely the one adopted by ACEL (2004). We use
an updated sample spanning the period from 1959:2 to 2008:2 of their 10-dimensional data
vector containing stationary combinations of diﬀerent macro aggregates. We add to this the
ratio of corporate proﬁts to GDP as an eleventh variable.12
The shock identiﬁcation is taken directly from ACEL (2004). They identify a monetary
policy shock, a neutral technology shock and an investment-speciﬁc technology shock based
on the following restrictions developed in previous work by Shapiro and Watson (1988),
Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (1998) and Fisher (2006):
• The monetary policy shock is identiﬁed as an innovation to the federal funds rate that
may only have a contemporaneous eﬀect on velocity and real proﬁts.
• The neutral technology shock and the investment-speciﬁc technology shock are the
only innovations that may have a permanent eﬀect on labor productivity.
• The investment-speciﬁc technology shock is the only innovation that may have a per-
manent eﬀect on the relative price of investment goods.
Since our model satisﬁes all of these timing and long-run properties of the shock processes,
12The variables used in the VAR are: (1) the change in the relative price of investment; (2) labor pro-
ductivity growth; (3) GDP deﬂator inﬂation; (4) capacity utilization; (5) hours; (6) labor income share; (7)
the consumption-output ratio; (8) the investment-output ratio; (9) the federal funds rate; (10) the velocity
of MZM transaction balances; and (11) the proﬁt-output ratio. The investment price data is an updated
sample of the series computed in DiCecio (2009). The other series are described in the appendix.20 21
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we directly compare the IRFs of our model with the empirical VAR responses. Denote by
ˆ Ψ the vector of IRFs over a time period of 20 quarters for each of the three shocks obtained
from the identiﬁed VAR. Likewise, denote by Ψ(ζ) the same vector of IRFs implied by our
model, where ζ contains all the structural parameters of the model. Then, the estimator of
some parameter subset ζ











ˆ Ψ − Ψ(ζ)
￿
,
where Ω is a diagonal matrix with the sample variances of ˆ Ψ along the diagonal.13
5.2. Structural VAR evidence
Figure 2 displays the IRFs of the ﬁve key variables output, average hours, real wages,
inﬂation and real proﬁts to a one standard deviation change in each of the three identiﬁed
shocks. The thin solid lines are the point estimates from the VAR, with the surrounding
grey areas representing the 95% conﬁdence intervals.14 The circled lines pertain to the IRFs
from the estimated model and are discussed afterwards.
For the monetary policy shock, we identify the following stylized facts: (i) output, hours
and real proﬁts respond with a signiﬁcant hump that peaks four to ﬁve quarters after the
shock; (ii) the real wage rate increases slightly, yet insigniﬁcantly; (iii) inﬂation drops on
impact, although insigniﬁcantly, and then exhibits a delayed positive hump-shape.
For the neutral technology shock, the following observations stand out: (i) output jumps
on impact and then gradually increases to its new permanent level; (ii) hours react little on
impact before displaying a hump-shaped response back to their initial value; (iii) the real
wage rate hardly reacts on impact and then increases slowly to its new permanent level; (iv)
inﬂation drops sharply on impact before slowly returning towards the initial rate. While the
13Jorda and Kozicki (2005) extend this estimation method with an eﬃcient weighting matrix that allows
for statistical testing.
14The conﬁdence intervals were computed by bootstrap simulation. See ACEL (2004) for details.20 21
The Business Cycle Implications of Reciprocity in Labor Relations 21
reaction of hours to the technology shock is a topic of much controversy, the sharp drop in
inﬂation and the sluggish reaction of real wages are robust features of VAR studies.15
For the investment-speciﬁc technology shock, ﬁnally, we ﬁnd that (i) output, hours and
real proﬁts jump on impact; (ii) inﬂation reacts positively but insigniﬁcantly; and (iii) the
real wage rate falls on impact before sluggishly increasing to its new permanent level.
In sum, the striking observation from these VAR results is the small and sluggish response
of real wages, irrespective of the type of shock, and the very distinct reaction of inﬂation
with respect to monetary and neutral technology shocks.
5.3. Estimation results
We partition the parameters of our model into two groups. The ﬁrst group consists of
model parameters that we calibrate such as to match salient long-run characteristics of the
data. Table 1 reports the calibrations. The ﬁrst four values imply a labor share close to 0.7
as reported by Gollin (2002); an average annualized real interest rate of 3 percent; an average
markup for ﬁnal goods producers of 11% in line with Basu and Fernald (1997); and an annual
depreciation rate of 10 percent. The values for the three growth rates μV, μA and μM are
set such as to match the sample averages for the decrease in the price of investment relative
to the GDP deﬂator (1.68% annually), the growth rate of real GDP (1.81% annually), and
the growth rate of our money aggregate (6.98% annually). Finally, steady state velocity v
equals the average value of C/Q over the sample; the value of η is set such that the average
transaction cost for consumption goods is 2.5% of GDP, which equals the value added in
the ﬁnance, insurance and real estate sector (see Christiano, Motto and Rostagno, 2003);
and the ﬁxed cost parameter is set such that economy-wide net proﬁts are zero as suggested
by Basu and Fernald (1994) or Rotemberg and Woodford (1995). The calibration for all
parameters but α and θp is as in ACEL (2004).
The second group of parameters is estimated and consists of structural model parameters
15The appendix reviews this VAR literature as well as other empirical evidence.22 23
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ϕ1, ϕ3, s, γ, ωp, b, σu, S￿￿, � as well as the parameters governing the dynamics of the exogenous
shock processes. As shown in Proposition 1, balanced growth imposes 1 = ϕ1+ ϕ2 +ϕ3. We
thus estimate only ϕ1 and ϕ3. For pricing, there is a direct mapping (given ωp) between the
NKPC slope parameter γ and the probability of price reoptimization 1 − κp. This mapping
depends on the existence of ﬁrm-speciﬁc capital and non-convexities in demand (see for
example Eichenbaum and Fischer, 2007). While we do not model these features, they could
be easily introduced. We thus estimate γ directly and attach less importance to the value for
κp that this estimate implies. The last three structural model parameters are, respectively,
the curvature of the investment adjustment cost function S￿￿; the elasticity of the slope of
the capital depreciation rate with respect to utilization σu ≡ δ
￿￿(u)u/δ
￿(u); and the interest
semi-elasticity of money demand � as deﬁned in ACEL (2004). Together with the other
parameters, they determine the dynamics of the loglinearized system.16
We estimate the diﬀerent parameters to match the following IRFs computed from the
VAR: output, money growth, inﬂation, the Fed Funds rate, capacity utilization, hours
worked, real wages, consumption, investment, velocity, the relative price of investment and
real proﬁts. The ﬁrst column of Table 2 reports the point estimates and the associated
standard errors (in parenthesis).17 Both the coeﬃcient for rent sharing of ˆ ϕ1 = 0.27 and the
coeﬃcient on wage entitlement of ˆ ϕ3 = 0.68 are sizable and precisely estimated. The two
estimates together imply ˆ ϕ2 = 1 − ˆ ϕ1 − ˆ ϕ3 = 0.05. Hence, external employment conditions
are estimated to play only a minor role for wage setting, which accords well with the survey
studies on reciprocity discussed in Section 2.
The estimate of ˆ s = 1 indicates that the data favors a purely social norm version of wage
entitlement where workers care about past aggregate wages rather than the ﬁrm-internal
past wage.18 In response, ﬁrms do not internalize the eﬀect of current wages on future eﬀort
16For S￿￿ = 0, adjustment cost are zero around the steady state. For σu = 0, capital utilization is
proportional to the rental rate whereas for σu → ∞ utilization is constant.
17Standard errors are inferred from the empirical weighting matrix via the delta method. See ACEL
(2004).
18Since this parameter is estimated to be at its upper bound, it would not be meaningful to report standard22 23
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and adopt a compensation policy that keeps eﬀort constant at all times (see Proposition
2). Since workers remain on average in the same job for several quarters, this estimate of s
may not seem so plausible. In the robustness section at the end of the paper, we therefore
reestimate the model with s calibrated to a value in line with job ﬂows data.
Turning to pricing, we estimate a coeﬃcient on real marginal cost in the NKPC of
ˆ γ = 0.27 and a weight for lagged inﬂation indexation of ˆ ωp = 0. The estimate of ˆ γ = 0.27
implies an average price rigidity of only 2.5 quarters, which is close to the micro-estimates
of price rigidity by Bils and Klenow (2004) and others even though our model does not
feature ﬁrm-speciﬁc capital or non-convexities in demand. This estimate is much higher
than the corresponding value reported in other single-equation and full-information DSGE
estimations.19 We reconsider this issue in the robustness section. The estimate of ˆ ωp = 0
implies θb = 0 which means that inﬂation is a purely forward-looking process. This is
somewhat lower than reported in other estimations, which report values of θb around 0.25,
and contrasts with CEE (2005) and ACEL (2004) who ﬁx ωp = 1, which implies θb ≈ 0.5.
The estimates of the other parameters are close to those reported in ACEL (2004) with
three notable exceptions. First, capital utilization is estimated to be considerably less costly
in our model; second, the estimated standard deviation of the neutral technology growth
innovation is almost three times smaller in our model; and third, monetary policy in our
model is estimated not to accommodate neutral technology growth (i.e. ˆ φμA = 0). The last
two diﬀerences suggest that our reciprocity model generates larger internal ampliﬁcation with
respect to neutral technology shocks than a similar model with nominal wage contracts. We
conﬁrm this conjecture in the appendix.
errors for it. We thus ﬁx it when computing standard errors for the other parameters. We adopt the same
approach throughout the paper for any parameter that is estimated at one of its bounds.
19See Gali and Gertler (1999) and Kurmann (2007) among many others for single-equation estimates; or
Smets and Wouters (2007) for full-information DSGE estimates.24 25
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5.4. Empirical performance
We evaluate the performance of the estimated model by comparing the ﬁt of the model-
generated IRFs with the empirical counterparts from the VAR. Reconsider Figure 2, which
plots the IRFs of output, hours, inﬂation, real wages and real proﬁts.20 The model is
successful in generating the hump-shaped response of output and hours with respect to
all three shocks. The model also performs remarkably well with respect to inﬂation. In
particular, the estimated model is capable of simultaneously generating the delayed, hump-
shaped response of inﬂation after a monetary policy shock and the sharp drop of inﬂation
on impact of the neutral technology shock. However, the model cannot match the small
positive response of inﬂation to the investment-speciﬁc shock.
The key to understanding these very diﬀerent responses of inﬂation is the forward-looking
nature of the NKPC, which implies that inﬂation depends on the expected path of future
marginal cost. In response to the monetary policy shock, marginal cost drops on impact
and becomes slightly positive only after 8 quarters (shown in the appendix). As a result,
inﬂation falls slightly on impact (thus rationalizing the price puzzle observed in the data)
before increasing in a persistent, hump-shaped pattern. With respect to a neutral technology
shock, marginal cost responds negatively and reverts only slowly to steady state. Inﬂation
thus drops sharply on impact and remains below trend for more than 10 quarters. A similar
fall in marginal cost explains why inﬂation drops after an investment-speciﬁc shock.
The negative response of marginal cost to the three shocks is in part due to the direct
impact of interest rates and, in case of the neutral technology shock, to total factor produc-
tivity. The second important contributor is the sluggish or even inverse dynamics of real
wages, due to the presence of both wage entitlement and rent-sharing.21 In particular, if
20The appendix reports the IRFs of all variables used in the estimation. Overall, the model matches the
dynamics of the diﬀerent variables well.
21The estimated model implies a small negative reaction of real wages on impact of the monetary policy
shock whereas in the VAR, the response is slightly positive. It should be noted, however, that the response
of real wages to a monetary shock is highly sensitive to the speciﬁcation and sample period of the VAR. For
example, ACEL (2004) report for their 1959:2-2001:4 sample that real wages slightly fall over the ﬁrst few24 25
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external employment conditions were important for worker’s evaluation of fairness (i.e. if
ϕ2 = 1 − ϕ1 − ϕ3 was large), wages would become more volatile and the model would lose
the ability to match the inﬂation response with respect to the diﬀerent shocks. In addition,
if we turned oﬀ rent-sharing and increased wage entitlement (so as to keep ϕ2 low), the drop
in marginal cost in response to a monetary policy shock would be much smaller and inﬂation
would react positively on impact of the shock. Hence, rent-sharing contributes a powerful
new mechanism for wage rigidity, especially with respect to non-technology shocks.
Finally, consider real proﬁts. The model generates a positive hump-shaped response
with respect to the monetary policy shock. While the magnitude is smaller than the point
estimates observed in the data, this positive response is to be considered as a success of the
model. In fact, CEE (1997) ﬁnd that a baseline sticky price model with a Walrasian labor
market generates a counterfactual negative response and view this as a key failing of New
Keynesian models. The estimated model is also capable of matching the ﬂat response of real
proﬁts on impact of the neutral technology shock and the slight jump in real proﬁts after
the embodied technology shock. As with inﬂation, the key to understanding these reactions
of real proﬁts is the dynamics of marginal cost and thus wage setting.
5.5. Robustness
We assess the robustness of the model’s performance along three dimensions. First,
as discussed above, our estimate of ˆ γ = 0.27 is high whereas ˆ ωp = 0 is low relative to
estimates typically reported in the literature. We therefore ﬁx γ = 0.021 and ωp = 0.228,
which are the values implied by the point estimate reported in Smets and Wouters (2007),
and reestimate the other parameters. The second column of Table 2 reports the results.
Many of the parameters remain close to the baseline estimates, including the coeﬃcients for
rent-sharing and wage entitlement. However, the model now requires substantially larger
quarters after the monetary policy shock, with the other macro aggregates reacting very similarly to those
estimated by our VAR. A similar countercyclical response is also present in Edge et al. (2003).26 27
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neutral technology shocks and monetary policy provides stronger accommodation for both
technology shocks. As we report in the appendix, the model is still capable of matching the
ampliﬁed, hump-shaped responses of the real aggregates to the diﬀerent shocks. Furthermore,
inﬂation still reacts sluggishly to the monetary policy shock and drops on impact of the
neutral technology shock, although to a lesser extent. This is because inﬂation is now
much less sensitive to marginal cost and because monetary policy accommodates the neutral
technology shock.
The second robustness check is with respect to s, the relative importance of social norms
in wage entitlement. As we noted above, the estimate of ˆ s = 1 may not be very plausible
because workers on average remain in the same job for several quarters and thus, wage
entitlement should be at least partially ﬁrm-internal (i.e., the personal norm). Information
on the proportion of job stayers in the total workforce is provided by the survey of Davis et
al. (2006). Based on data from the Longitudinal Employer Household Dynamics (LEHD),
these authors report that about 24% of all workers change establishments each quarter.22 We
thus set s = 0.25 and reestimate the remaining parameters (but keeping γ = 0.021 and ωp =
0.228). The resulting estimates are reported in the third column of Table 2. Rent-sharing is
now estimated to be zero whereas wage entitlement becomes more important (the implied
weight on external employment conditions increases only slightly to ϕ2 = 1−ϕ1−ϕ3 = 0.086).
The other parameters are estimated to be similar to the ones reported above. As we show
in the appendix, eﬀort now reacts countercyclically to all three shocks but the relative
magnitude of these ﬂuctuations is modest. Consequently, the overall ﬁt of the model remains
close to the one obtained for the ﬁrst robustness exercise. The appendix also explains in
detail why rent-sharing disappears in this case. In short, when γ is small, rent-sharing is
less powerful in smoothening inﬂation after a monetary policy shock and the estimation has
22A quarterly separation rate of 24% is substantially higher than the typical 10% measured in the JOLTS
dataset or inferred from CPS unemployment dynamics (e.g. Shimer, 2005). The reason for this discrepancy
is that the LEHD data includes all separations of workers, even those who go through very short employment
spells (i.e., get hired and leave in the same quarter). For our purpose, this seems like the appropriate measure.26 27
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a harder time identifying its importance relative to wage entitlement.23
The third robustness exercise consists of reestimating the model based on IRFs obtained
from a VAR on the shorter 1982-2008 sample. This is motivated by recent evidence suggest-
ing that the conduct of monetary policy has changed and that the relative importance of
shocks has decreased substantially starting in the early 1980s. All estimates and IRFs are
available in the appendix. There are some quantitative diﬀerences in the VAR results. But
the model remains capable of matching the dynamics of most macro aggregates. Most im-
portantly, given the above robustness checks, rent-sharing is estimated to have more weight
in wage setting than wage entitlement (outside employment conditions remain negligible).
This remains true even if we restrict γ and ωp to the relevant estimates from Smets and
Wouters (2007) and ﬁx s = 0.25.
6. Conclusion
In this paper, we incorporate a reciprocity-based model of wage determination into a
modern DSGE framework. We estimate the structural parameters of the model and assess its
ability to generate the distinct dynamics of prominent macroeconomic aggregates in response
to various exogenous shocks. Our estimation suggests that workers’ past wage level (a factor
we associate with a sense of wage entitlement) but also ﬁrms’ ability to pay (resulting from
rent-sharing considerations) are the most important determinants of wage setting. Aggregate
labor market conditions — the wage reference typically emphasized in standard eﬃciency
wage formulations — are estimated to be of minor importance. These ﬁndings accord well
with a large number of survey studies on reciprocity in labor relations and wage setting
in general. The reason often given in these studies for the relative unimportance of ﬁrm-
external labor market conditions is that individuals have only little knowledge of the market
23For example, we could ﬁx ϕ1 = 0.25 and reestimate the model without greatly deteriorating the ﬁt of
the model. Also, if we simply ﬁxed s = 0.25 and reestimated all other parameters including γ and ωp,
rent-sharing would remain important.28 29
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value of their work and thus resort to alternative reference points. While our model stops
short of formalizing this information problem, we ﬁnd the match between our estimates of the
determinants of wage setting and the survey evidence intriguing and suggestive of interesting
avenues for future research.
Overall, the estimated reciprocity model performs well when confronted with the empir-
ical VAR dynamics of key variables. In particular, the presence of rent-sharing allows the
model to simultaneously replicate the sluggish response of inﬂation after a monetary policy
shock and the sharp drop in inﬂation on impact of a neutral technology shock. This is an
interesting diﬀerence to models with nominal wage contracts, which typically fail to generate
these distinct conditional responses of inﬂation.
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Standard errors are computed via the delta method from the bootstrapped
variance matrix of the IRFs. See ACEL (2004) for details.34 35










Fig. 1a: Effect of rent-sharing for a technology shock
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